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Difference between revisions of "List of cryptography functions"
From NetSec
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| align="center" style="background:#f0f0f0;"|'''Notes''' | | align="center" style="background:#f0f0f0;"|'''Notes''' | ||
|- | |- | ||
| − | | AES||128||128,192,256||||Yes|| | + | | AES||128||128,192,256||||Yes|||| |
|- | |- | ||
| − | | DES||64||56|||||No||[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_Encryption_Standard#Brute_force_attack In 2008 their COPACOBANA RIVYERA reduced the time to break DES to less than one day, using 128 Spartan-3 5000's.] | + | | DES||64||56|||||No||[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_Encryption_Standard#Brute_force_attack In 2008 their COPACOBANA RIVYERA reduced the time to break DES to less than one day, using 128 Spartan-3 5000's.]|| |
|- | |- | ||
| − | | 3DES||64||168,112,56|||||No|| | + | | 3DES||64||168,112,56|||||No|||| |
|- | |- | ||
| Blowfish||64||32-448|||||Not ideal||||This is the primary mode of encryption used in IRC encryption plugins. | | Blowfish||64||32-448|||||Not ideal||||This is the primary mode of encryption used in IRC encryption plugins. | ||
Revision as of 22:36, 26 October 2015
| Name | Value |
| Recommended public key algorithms | Curve25519, Ed25519, ECDSA, RSA |
| Recommended symmetric ciphers | Salsa20, ChaCha20, AES |
| Recommended minimum key size (symmetric) | 128 bits |
| Preferred minimum key size (symmetric) | 256 bits |
| Recommended minimum key size (RSA) | 2048 bits |
| Preferred minimum key size (RSA) | 4096 bits |
| Mode | AKA | Should use? | Authenticated? (unauthed modes require seperate auth) | Encryption parallelizable? | Decryption parallelizable? | Random read? | Notes |
| Electronic Code Book | ECB | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Same plaintext yields same ciphertext. |
| Cipher Feedback | CFB | Yes | No | No | Yes | Yes | |
| Output Feedback | OFB | Yes | No | No | No | No | |
| Cipher Block Chaining | CBC | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Vulnerable to CBC-R and padding oracle attacks, steps such as encrypt-then-MAC must be taken to mitigate. |
| Counter | CTR | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | |
| Galois Counter Mode | GCM | Recommended | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Counter mode plus authentication, very efficient. |
| Cipher | Block size (bits) | Key size (bits) | Stream? | Should use? | Estimated Time to Crack | Notes |
| AES | 128 | 128,192,256 | Yes | |||
| DES | 64 | 56 | No | In 2008 their COPACOBANA RIVYERA reduced the time to break DES to less than one day, using 128 Spartan-3 5000's. | ||
| 3DES | 64 | 168,112,56 | No | |||
| Blowfish | 64 | 32-448 | Not ideal | This is the primary mode of encryption used in IRC encryption plugins. | ||
| ChaCha20 | 256 | Yes | Yes | |||
| Salsa20 | 256 | Yes | Yes | |||
| RC4 | 40-2048 | Yes | No |
| Cipher | ECC? | Signing | Encryption | DH Key exchange | Should use? | Minimum key size | Recommended key size | Notes |
| RSA | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | 2048 | 4096 | |
| DSA | No | Yes | Yes | No | No | 2048 | 4096 | |
| ElGamal | No | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | 2048 | 4096 | |
| ECDSA | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | 256 | 384 | |
| ECDH | Yes | No | No | Yes | Yes | 256 | 384 | |
| Ed25519 | Yes | Yes | No | No | Recommended | 512 | 512 | |
| Curve25519 | Yes | No | No | Yes | Recommended | 256 | 256 |
| Hash | Bits | Broken? | Should use? | Notes |
| MD5 | 128 | Yes | No | Collisions can be generated at will with desktop computational power. |
| SHA-1 | 160 | Yes | No | Collision are expensive to generate, but a sufficiently motivated adversary can do it. |
| SHA-2 | 224-512 | No | Yes | Pseudo-collisions generated with partial SHA-256, no full attacks. |
| SHA-3 (Keccak) | 224-512 | No | Yes | Not widely implemented yet. |
| Algorithm | Password? | Requires uniform random input? | Slow? | Notes |
| Bcrypt | Yes | No | Yes | |
| Scrypt | Yes | No | Yes | |
| PBKDF2 | Yes | No | Yes | |
| HKDF | No | Yes | No |
| Algorithm | Hash-based? | Block cipher based? | Notes |
| Poly1305 | No | Yes | |
| HMAC | Yes | No | |
| CBC-MAC | No | Yes | |
| PMAC | No | Yes | |
| CMAC | No | Yes |